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Research sponsorship
One of the most difficult issues currently affecting
scientific research is the influence of research sponsors
[1]. In recent years this has been brought to a head by a
number of notorious cases in the biomedical research
field [2], and this has led to many journals, especially
medical ones, introducing strict rules for the declaration of
conflicts of interest [3]. As a matter of fact, awareness of
such potential conflicts has been gradually increasing for
the last 50 years or so, as illustrated, for example, by
interesting data collected by Gingras and Gosselin [4].
This seems to be no doubt about the reality of bias
brought about by sponsorship. For example, Stelfox et al.
studied a large number, about 70, of articles dealing with
calcium channel blockers (used to treat high blood
pressure): 96% of the authors of articles evaluating a
drug favourably had financial links with a manufacturer
of the drug; 60% of neutral articles had such links; 37%
of unfavourable articles had them [5].
It is somewhat doubtful whether the formal
obligation to declare financial interests (or their absence)
has any more effect on authors’ actions than, for
example, the statutory health warnings printed on
cigarette packets have on discouraging smokers. It is in
any case impracticable for the editors of a journal to
police these declarations. The Macmillan journal Nature
has, in effect, adopted a policy of self-policing (rather like
the “self-ticket-inspection” policy on many Swiss trains)
by offering as a definition of declarable interest: “Any
undeclared competing financial interests that could
embarrass you were they to become publicly known after
your work was published.” Anyone with a significant
interest could, I imagine, take good care to keep it secret
if they so desired. It is indeed quite likely that the current
trend to require these declarations represents a disservice
to the overall work of scientists (of which dissemination
is only a part). I cannot help thinking of an anecdote
related by George Mikes: during a visit to Switzerland his
wife wished to iron some clothes and, in a shop selling
domestic electrical appliances, asked whether it was
possible to rent an iron. It turned out that the shop only
sold them, but the shopkeeper kindly offered to lend one
gratis. Mrs Mikes was delighted and offered to leave a
deposit, or at least her name and address—at which point
her husband hastily led her out of the shop because it was
clear from the look on the shopkeeper’s face that she
was beginning to suspect some criminal intent—these
were obviously people to whom the possibility that an
iron might be stolen had occured [6].
Somewhat reassuringly, there is growing debate and
discussion about the matter. C.L. Berry has recently
delivered an illuminating lecture, subsequently published
[7], particularly examining the circumstance that
knowledge production is typically context-dependent. In
other words, the facts are one thing; their interpretation
(according to which real knowledge is produced) is
another. In notorious case, involving the firm Monsanto
and the drug bovine somatotrophin, the firm not only
claimed the rights over the raw data emerging from the
study it had sponsored, but also over the analysis of the
data, even if already in the public domain [8].
While sponsor influence (leading to bias; i.e., a
departure from objectivity and, hence, from the scientific
method) appears to be most prevalent in the medical and
veterinary fields, it is by no means confined to them;
obviously it covers all areas of scientific research,
although, perhaps because of the emotional aspects of
medicine, other areas are far less in the spotlight. Besides
that, biomedical research constitutes a very significant
proportion of the total research effort. It is highly
distressing that the fairly recent Lambert Report [9],
which specifically reviews business–university collaboration
in the UK, makes no mention of the deleterious impacts
of sponsorship. There is no escaping the fundamental
bottom line, that “he who pays the piper calls the tune”.
Denman has expressed this in lapidary fashion: “Truth, as
one saw it [in academic life], was outspoken and
expectant of contradiction, confrontation, rebuttal,
denunciation and criticism. Words were not trimmed nor
ideas double-thought. Straight flung speech was never
considered impolite. The professional world, on the
contrary, appeared to confuse politeness with deference.
The shopkeeper’s code, the customer is always right,
was the aphorism to work by. Should the principal or
client wish to think that black is white, don’t disillusion
him—you might lose a fee! What the French call
prévenance held precedence over a hammered out
truth” [10]. Once academic independence is lost, there is
no bulwark against an insidious erosion of values. Brown
quotes the following [11]: “The moment of truth arrived
for me [Peter Desbarats, former Dean of Journalism at
the University of Western Ontario] in 1995, when Rogers
Communications granted my request for $1 million to
endow a chair of information studies, for which I was
extremely grateful. When journalists asked me to
comment on the subsequent Rogers takeover of McLean
Hunter, all I could do was draw their attention to the
donation. They understood right away that I had been, to
4    J.J. Ramsden    Research sponsorship______________________________________________________________________________________________________
JBPC  Vol. 11 (2011)
express it crudely, bought. This had nothing to do with
Rogers. I had begged for the money. It was given with no
strings attached. It will serve a useful purpose. But
unavoidably, I gave up something in return. No one should
ever pretend, least of all university presidents, that this
experience, multiplied many times and repeated over the
years, doesn’t damage universities in the long run”.
Several writers have commented on the changing
modes of research (i.e., knowledge production). Gibbons
et al. refer to “Mode 1” (traditional “academic”) and
“Mode 2” (sponsored) [12]; Ziman to non- (or pre-)
instrumental and instrumental [13]. Of course, the root
problem is that research costs money. Even the
researcher who needs only pencil and paper for his work
needs shelter and sustenance. Historically, one notices the
following progression: Mode I (e.g., Socrates, Cavendish,
Joule, Rayleigh) is the private individual carrying out
research at his own expense; sometimes (but all too
rarely) the work is supported by private philanthropists in
a more institutional fashion (e.g., Davy, Faraday and
others at the Royal Institution in London). Mode II is the
University that makes money from tuition (in the extreme
case, research is only possible during the vacations).
Mode III is represented by government institutes. In
some countries (e.g., Great Britain, Switzerland) this was
never of great importance except in specialized domains
that often combined danger with strategic importance
(e.g., atomic weapons at Aldermaston or rocket propulsion
at Westcott); in others (e.g., France, Germany, Italy, the
USSR) this was and in some cases still is the principal
mode (CNRS, Max Planck institutes, CNR, Academy of
Sciences institutes). Mode IV is research carried out by
commercial industry, in some cases (e.g., at the former
AT&T Bell Laboratories) in a manner comparable to, and
with much better facilities than, traditional academic
(Mode II) research (Spier [14] gives a good description of
industrial research in contrast to academic). Note that
there is some mixing between modes (e.g., nowadays the
government heavily subsidizes most UK universities,
even though they are private foundations; in continental
Europe, universities are anyway mostly state institutions).
As well as their rôle in gathering funds from the
general economic activity of the country through various
taxes (income, corporation, sales etc.) and disbursing it to
fund activities (e.g., research) that are considered to be
beneficial for the country but not necessarily supported
privately, there is also a consideration that, at least in the
past, governments are considered to be guarantors of
integrity, much as, for example, private telephone
companies were nationalized in order to avoid the misuse
of subscribers’ conversations; a similar consideration
underpins the provision of government postal services.
Nevertheless, governments have their own political, if not
commercial interests and these can potentially be
influenced by lobbying. Indeed, the research and
technical development programmes financed by the
European Union are notoriously susceptible to such
influence. Given that tendencially more and more public
research funding comes in the form of a tightly controlled
contracts to carry out specific pieces of research (usually
through the medium of grants made by research councils,
national science foundations etc.) there is clearly the
possibility of a similar distortion of the traditional values of
disinterestedness, impartiality and openness that is
associated with commercially sponsored research. Some
academics, such as Ziman [13] and Berdahl (quoted by
Brown [11]), strongly assert that traditional academic
research is effectively dead and cannot be revived. This
effete hand-wringing has little to commend it. It is
justified by the seemingly modern view that one cannot
“turn the clock back”, but actually abandonment of
academic research ideals would turn the clock back
much further to the era of myth and superstition. Perhaps
we should abandon the term “academic research”, which
is anyway rather ill-defined. Nowadays it seems to have
a somewhat pejorative connotation, probably because of
the excessive production of what is, by any objective
criterion, useless knowledge (with neither the grandeur of
discovery nor the potential for improving man’s estate).
Incidentally, much of the output of research grant-funded
work appears to be similarly useless (e.g., judging by the
monthly digests from the European Union [15]), despite
the fact that this mode of operating was expressly
introduced to weed out useless activity. Rather, we should
refer to research carried out in accordance with the
scientific method (the objectivity of which requires the
traditional values of disinterestedness, impartiality and
openness). In this regard there is indeed no difference
between “basic” and “applied” research, as A.M. Prokhorov
has asserted. The contrast is between this scientific
(objective) research and “research” in which some of the
conditions are relaxed and the results of which are, as a
result, unreliable [16].
J.D. Bernal has emphasized the huge returns
(especially to society as a whole) from investment in
research [17]. Undoubtedly the application of the
scientific method led to the discovery of certain drugs,
which appeared to be beneficial to patients, and which
spawned a huge industry to manufacture and sell these
drugs. Further research resulted in the subsequent
discovery of deleterious effects of those drugs, at which
point it would have been consequential to immediately
withdraw them from medical practice. The fact that this
is often not done, or strongly resisted, by what have
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meanwhile become immense commercial interests, can
be seen, metaphorically speaking, as a result of “friction”
or “inertia” that prevents the overall system from
evolving in a more beneficial fashion. If something is to
be done, it should be directed towards the diminution of
that friction. The complexity of today’s situation, in
which the interests of science and industry are sometimes
seemingly inextricably entangled, is well illustrated by the
fact that the provision of social services (e.g., pensions)
to the staff of scientific research institutes is likely to
depend on the financial well being of companies
marketing drugs on the basis of unreliable knowledge.
Ultimately, it is perhaps impossible ever to circumvent the
maxim that “one cannot do research of real integrity if
one has to depend on sponsors”; one can perhaps only
hope to alleviate some of the worst effects of dependency.
It is a corollary that the “funded project” so beloved of
university administrators is a barbed hook, the extraction
of which is likely to turn winning such a project into a
Pyrrhic victory. The quantum computer springs to mind
as an analogy: its reliable operation requires isolation from
its environment. Independence and integrity can only be
achieved if the funding is wholly decoupled from the
research. But, given that some degree of entanglement
seems to be unavoidable, it is surely worth exploring
whether some kind of “error correction” can be applied
to ensure that the output under such circumstances is
objectively acceptable.
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